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In all papers on the BB84 protocol, the transmission probability of each bit value is usually set to be equal. In
this paper, we show that by assigning different transmission probability to each transmitted qubit within a single
polarization basis, we can generally improve the key generation rate of the BB84 protocol and achieve a higher
key rate.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has attracted great atten-
tion as an unconditionally secure key distribution scheme. The
basic idea of QKD protocol is to exploit the quantum mechan-
ical principle that observation in general disturbs the system
being observed. Thus, if there is an eavesdropper (Eve) lis-
tening while the two legitimate communicating users, namely
Alice and Bob, attempt to transmit their key, the presence of
the eavesdropper will be visible as a disturbance of the com-
munication channel that Alice and Bob are using to generate
the secret key. Alice and Bob can then throw out the key bits
established while Eve was listening in, and start over. The key
generation rate, which is the length of the securely sharable
key per channel use, is one of the most important criteria for
the efficiency of the QKD protocol. The first QKD protocol,
which was proposed in 1984 [1], is called BB84 after its in-
ventors (Bennet and Brassard).
QKD protocol usually consists of two parts: a quantum and
a classical part. In the quantum part, Alice sends qubits pre-
pared in certain states to Bob. The states of these qubits are
encodings of bit values randomly chosen by Alice. Bob per-
forms a measurement on the qubits to decode the bit values.
For each of the bits, both the encoding and decoding are cho-
sen from a certain set of operators. After the transmission
steps, Alice and Bob apply sifting where they publicly com-
pare the encoding and decoding operator they have used and
keep only the bit pairs for which these operators match.
Once Alice and Bob have correlated bit strings, they pro-
ceed with the classical part of the protocol. In a first step,
called parameter estimation, they compare the bit values for
randomly chosen samples from their strings to estimate the
quantum channel. After the parameter estimation, Alice and
Bob proceed with a classical processing, where Alice and Bob
share a secret key based on their bit sequences obtained in the
quantum part.
Mathematically, quantum channels are described by trace
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preserving completely positive (TPCP) maps [2]. Convention-
ally, in the BB84 protocol, we only used the statistics of the
matched measurement outcomes, which are transmitted and
received in the same basis, to estimate the TPCP map that
describes the quantum channel, while the mismatched mea-
surement outcomes, which are transmitted and received in dif-
ferent bases, were discarded. However, Watanabe et al. [3]
showed that by using the statistics of both matched and mis-
matched measurement outcomes, the TPCP maps describing
the quantum channel can be estimated more accurately. They
implemented a practical classical processing for the six-state
and BB84 protocols that utilizes their accurate channel esti-
mation method and showed that the key rates obtained with
their method were at least as high as the key rates obtained
with the standard processing by Shor and Preskill [4].
In the BB84 protocol [1], Alice creates random bits of 0 and
1 with equal probability. Then, Alice and Bob each chooses
between the two bases, i.e. the rectilinear basis (or z basis) of
vertical (0◦) and horizontal (90◦) polarizations, and the diago-
nal basis (or x basis) of 45◦ and 135◦ polarizations, with equal
probability. Lo et al. [5] proposed a simple modification of
the standard BB84 protocol [1] by assigning significantly dif-
ferent probabilities to the different polarization bases during
both transmission and reception. They showed that the modi-
fication could reduce the fraction of mismatched measurement
outcomes, thus nearly doubles the efficiency of the BB84 pro-
tocol.
In this paper, we propose a modification of the BB84 pro-
tocol by assigning a different transmission probability to each
transmitted qubit within a single polarization basis. While in
classical information, assignment of different probability to
each input bit can increase the mutual information of asym-
metric channels [6, Problem 7.8], in quantum key distribution
the benefit of assigning a different transmission probability to
each transmitted qubit was unknown. We show that by setting
a different transmission probability to each transmitted qubit,
we can improve the key rate and achieve a higher key rate.
We demonstrate this fact by using the accurate channel esti-
mation over the amplitude damping channel. We determine
the optimum bit transmission probability that maximizes the
key rate.
2II. MODIFICATION OF BB84 PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe a modification of the BB84 pro-
tocol where the transmission probability of each qubit within
a single polarization basis is not necessarily equal. The pro-
tocol consists of a quantum and a classical part. The quantum
part includes the distribution and measurement of quantum in-
formation, and is determined by the operators that Alice and
Bob use for their encoding and decoding.
For simplicity, we assume that Eve’s attack is the collective
attack1, i.e. the channel connecting Alice and Bob is given by
tensor products of a channel EB from a qubit density matrix
to itself. As is usual in a lot of QKD literature, we assume
that Eve can access all the environment of channel EB. The
channel to the environment is denoted by EE .
A. Quantum part: Distribution of Quantum Information and
Measurement
In the modified BB84 protocol, Alice chooses random bits
of 0 and 1 according to the probability distribution
PX(0) := q, PX(1) := 1− q. (1)
Alice modulates each bit into a transmission basis that is ran-
domly chosen from the z basis {|0z〉, |1z〉} and the x basis
{|0x〉, |1x〉}, where |0a〉 and |1a〉 are the eigenstates of the
Pauli matrix σa for a ∈ {x,z}. We occasionaly omit the sub-
scripts {x,y,z} of the basis, and the basis {|0〉, |1〉} is re-
garded as z basis unless otherwise stated. Then Bob randomly
chooses one of the measurement observables σa for a∈ {x,z},
and converts a measurement result +1 or −1 into a bit 0 or
1, respectively. Note that Alice and Bob keep the the mis-
matched measurement outcomes to estimate the channel more
accurately.
B. Classical part: Parameter Estimation and Classical
Processing
The classical part of the protocol that we consider is essen-
tially the same as the classical part of the protocol proposed
by Watanabe et al. [3]. However, since we assign a different
transmission probability to each transmitted qubit with a sin-
gle polarization basis (see Eq. (1)), some adjustments need to
be made accordingly.
The classical part of our protocol consists of two sub-
protocols, called parameter estimation and classical post-
processing. The main purpose of the parameter estimation
subprotocol is to estimate the amount of information gained
by the eavesdropper Eve during the distribution of the quan-
tum information.
1 By using the de Finetti representation arguments [7, 8], the result can be
extended to the coherent attack.
After the parameter estimation, Alice and Bob proceed with
a classical subprotocol. Hereafter, we treat only Alice’s bit se-
quence~x∈Fn2 that is transmitted in z basis and the correspond-
ing Bob’s bit sequence~y ∈ Fn2 that is received in σz measure-
ment, where F2 is the finite field of order 2. Our goal is to
generate a secure key pair (SA,SB), using~x and~y. Here Alice
and Bob want to generate a key pair (SA,SB) which is statis-
tically independent of Eve’s information by cloning the quan-
tum objects and looking at the conversation over the public
authenticated channel. The protocol we consider is one-way,
i.e. only communication from Alice to Bob or from Bob to
Alice, is needed. It consists of the following steps:
1. Information Reconciliation: Alice sends error correc-
tion information to Bob. Using the correction informa-
tion, Bob decode the bit string~y into an estimate of~x.
2. Privacy Amplification: Alice randomly chooses a hash
function from a set of universal hash functions and
sends the choice to Bob over the public channel. Then,
Alice and Bob compute SA and SB, respectively.
The above procedure is usually called the direct reconcili-
ation. The procedure in which the roles of Alice and Bob are
switched is called the reverse reconciliation [9].
Since the pair of the sequences (~x,~y) is transmitted and re-
ceived in z basis, they are independently identically distributed
according to
PXY (x,y) := PX(x)〈yz|EB(|xz〉〈xz|)|yz〉. (2)
Note that the distribution PXY can be estimated from the statis-
tics of the sample bits that are transmitted in z basis and mea-
sured by the observable σz.
The secure key rate is determined according to the result of
the privacy amplification [7]. For the direct reconciliation, let
Hρ(X |E) := H(ρXE)−H(ρE) (3)
be the conditional von Neumann entropy with respect to den-
sity matrix
ρXE := ∑
x∈F2
PX(x)|x〉〈x|⊗EE(|x〉〈x|), (4)
where H(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy for a density matrix
ρ and PX(x) is the probability distribution shown in Eq. (1).
The secure key rate [7] is
Hρ(X |E)−H(X |Y). (5)
While for the reverse reconciliation, we can calculate the
conditional von Neumann entropy Hρ(Y |E) := H(ρYE) −
H(ρE) from the channel EB as follows. We define
ρAB := (I⊗EB)(|ψ〉〈ψ |), (6)
for the entangled state
|ψ〉 :=√q|00〉+
√
1− q|11〉. (7)
3Let ΨABE be a purification of ρAB, and let ρBE := trA [ΨABE ].
Then the density matrix ρY E is derived by measurement on
Bob’s system, i.e.
ρYE := ∑
x∈F2
(|y〉〈y|⊗ I)ρBE(|y〉〈y|⊗ I). (8)
For the reverse reconciliation, the secure key rate [7] is
Hρ(Y |E)−H(Y |X). (9)
III. EVALUATION OF KEY RATE
A. Estimation of Eve’s Ambiguity
In the Stokes parametrization, the qubit channel EB can be
described by the affine map parametrized by 12 real parame-
ters [10, 11] as follows:

 θzθx
θy

 7→

 Rzz Rzx RzyRxz Rxx Rxy
Ryz Ryx Ryy



 θzθx
θy

+

 tztx
ty

 , (10)
where (θz,θx,θy) describes a vector in the Bloch sphere [2].
When Alice and Bob use only z basis and x basis, the statis-
tics of the input and output are irrelevant to the parameters
(Rzy,Rxy,Ryz,Ryx,Ryy, ty) in Eq. (10). Thus we can only esti-
mate the parameters ω = (Rzz,Rzx,Rxz,Rxx, tz, tx) by the accu-
rate channel estimation [3] and we have to consider the worst
case [3] for the parameters ω , i.e.
F(ω) := min
τ∈P ′(ω)
Hρτ (X |E), (11)
where P ′(ω) is the set of all parameters τ =
(Rzy,Rxy,Ryz,Ryx,Ryy, ty) such that the parameters ω and
τ constitute a qubit channel, and ρτ is the density matrix
which corresponds to the parameter τ .
We can simplify the form of the desired function F(ω)
when Eve’s ambiguity is convex [3]. We can prove the con-
vexity of Eve’s ambiguity with respect to EB in our protocol by
using the same technique used by Watanabe et al. [3, Lemma
2]. By the convexity of Eve’s ambiguity, the minimization in
Eq. (11) is achieved when the parameters Rzy, Rxy, Ryz, Ryx,
and ty, are all 0 [3, Proposition 1]. Hence, the number of free
parameters can be reduced to 1 and the remaining free param-
eter is Ryy. Thus the the problem is rewritten as looking for an
estimator of
F(ω) = min
Ryy∈P(ω)
HρRyy (X |E), (12)
where P(ω) is the set of parameters Ryy such that the param-
eters ω and Ryy consitute a qubit channel when other parame-
ters are all 0, and ρRyy is the density matrix corresponding to
the parameter Ryy.
B. Key Rates of Amplitude Damping Channel
In this section, we calculate the key rates of the BB84 proto-
col with our proposed procedure over the amplitude damping
channel, and determine the optimum bit transmission prob-
ability that maximizes the key generation rate. We clarify
the fact that the key rates using the optimum bit transmission
probability of the proposed BB84 protocol is higher than those
of the conventional protocol [3].
In the Stokes parametrization, the amplitude damping chan-
nel Ep is given by the affine map
 θzθx
θy

 7→

1− p 0 00 √1− p 0
0 0
√
1− p



 θzθx
θy

+

 p0
0

 , (13)
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
In the BB84 protocol, we can estimate the parameters Rzy =
1− p, Rzx = 0, Rxz = 0, Rxx =
√
1− p, tz = p, and tx = 0.
As explained in the previous section, we can set Rzy = Rxy =
Ryz = Rzy = Ryx = ty = 0. Furthermore, by the condition on
the TPCP map [11]
(Rxx −Ryy)2 ≤ (1−Rzz)2 − t2z , (14)
we can decide the remaining parameter as Ryy =
√
1− p.
By straightforward calculation, the asymptotic key genera-
tion rates for the direct and reverse reconciliations are
h
(
q+ p(1− q)
)
− h
(
p(1− q)
)
(15)
and
h(q)− h
(
p(1− q)
)
, (16)
respectively, where h(•) is the binary entropy function.
From Eqs. (15) and (16), we can easily see for p = 0, the
asymptotic key generation rates for both direct and reverse
reconciliations reach the maximum value when q = 12 . Please
recall that q is the bit transmission probability of bit 0 (see Eq.
(1)).
We can derive the optimum bit transmission probability by
the extreme value theorem. Let qˆ be the optimum bit transmis-
sion probability, i.e. the bit transmission probability (of bit 0)
that maximizes the key generation rate such that the key gen-
eration rate is positive. Then the channel parameter p and the
optimum bit transmission probability qˆ satisfy the following
condition:
• For direct reconciliation
1− qˆ
qˆ
=
(
p(1− qˆ)
1− p(1− qˆ)
)p
, (17)
where 0 ≤ p < 1 and 0 < qˆ < 1.
• For reverse reconciliation
1− p(1− qˆ)
p(1− qˆ) =
(
q+ p(1− qˆ)
(1− p)(1− qˆ)
) 1−p
p
, (18)
where 0 ≤ p < 12 and 0 < qˆ < 1.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Comparison of the asymptotic key genera-
tion rates against the channel parameter p of the amplitude damping
channel Ep. “Proposed Reverse" and “Proposed Direct" are the max-
imum asymptotic key generation rates for the reverse and direct rec-
onciliations with the optimum bit transmission probability qˆ, respec-
tively. While “Conventional Reverse" and “Conventional Direct" are
the asymptotic key generation rates for the reverse and direct recon-
ciliations when q = 12 , respectively given in [3].
The key rates for the direct and reverse reconciliations using
the optimum bit transmission probability are plotted in Fig. 1.
We find that the proposed key rates, i.e. the key rates when
q = qˆ, are higher than the conventional ones [3], i.e. the key
rates when q = 12 , in both the direct and reverse reconcilia-
tions. In the direct reconciliation, the proposed key rate is
slightly higher than that of the conventional one so that the
lines of the two key rates seem to overlap one another. While
in contrast, in the reverse reconciliation, the proposed key rate
grows much higher than the conventional one as the parameter
p increases. And especially when the parameter p & 0.7, we
can see that the proposed key rate is more than twice as high
as the conventional one.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a simple modification of the
BB84 protocol where the transmission probability of each
qubit within a single polarization basis is not necessarily
equal. We showed that by assigning a different transmis-
sion probability to each transmitted qubit, we can generally
increase the key generation rate of the BB84 protocol. We
demonstrated this by using the accurate channel estimation
over the amplitude damping channel. We determined the opti-
mum bit transmission probability that maximizes the key gen-
eration rate. We showed that in general, assignment of an
equal probability to each qubit within a single polarization ba-
sis is not necessarily optimal in QKD protocol.
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